Periodically, the EU seems to suffer a 'Ukraine fatigue', a 'Moldova fatigue' or an 'Eastern Partnership fatigue'. Usually, this comes after a country either disappoints in its reform performance or takes a less pro-EU turn, dashing Brussels' hope of finally achieving a modicum of stability and prosperity east of its borders. These problems are hardly caused by the EU. Many politicians in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus seem to put their own interests above those of their societies. To some of them, launching economic reforms or fighting corruption would amount to dismantling their own rule. This is at the core of most problems in the region and will not change overnight. But the EU needs to change its position, too. Simply put, Europe needs to recognize the political realities within Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries and adjust its reform expectations accordingly. Here is how.
Periodically, the EU seems to suffer a 'Ukraine fatigue', a 'Moldova fatigue' or an 'Eastern Partnership fatigue'. Usually, this comes after a country either disappoints in its reform performance or takes a less pro-EU turn, dashing Brussels' hope of finally achieving a modicum of stability and prosperity east of its borders.
These problems are hardly caused by the EU. Many politicians in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus seem to put their own interests above those of their societies. To some of them, launching economic reforms or fighting corruption would amount to dismantling their own rule. This is at the core of most problems in the region and will not change overnight. But the EU needs to change its position, too. Simply put, Europe needs to recognize the political realities within Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries and adjust its reform expectations accordingly. Here is how.
The six countries of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus are often mistakenly seen to be less developed versions of their Central European or Baltic peers. Many expect them to reform as their western neighbours did: with a bit of nudging and support from the EU, but in a more or less orderly way and on their own initiative.
But the analogy simply doesn't hold. The eastern neighbourhood is not what Central Europe was two decades ago. EaP countries are geographically more distant from western Europe and therefore less exposed to its influence, and they spent more time under the Soviet yoke than their Central European counterparts. Most EU officials would accept this, yet the Eastern Partnership policy remains little more than a lighter version of the EU's own enlargement policy, without the crucial prospect of membership.
But even if the eastern neighbourhood was Central Europe's twin, the EU alone could not trigger reforms; this requires local actors to take ownership. Poland and Estonia undertook difficult reforms long before they were promised EU membership. Moreover, while they had an enlightened elite pursuing the public good, they also enjoyed a relatively favourable geopolitical setting: in the 1990s, Europe and the US saw no real geopolitical rivals and Russia was weakened by its domestic crises.
Conditions today are very different. The EU is more consumed by its internal problems and has fewer resources to invest in the region. Not only do the EaP countries have no membership prospects for the moment, but the EU has become reluctant even to acknowledge their ambition to join the club one day. Financially, most of what the EU provides to the region are loans, not grants – for example, in Ukraine, grants constitute only 6% of total EU assistance.
The EU needs to accept that with the legacy of over 70 years of communism and two decades of trial-and-error attempts at transformation, the pace of reform for most EaP states will be significantly slower than it was in Central Europe. Rather than expecting swift changes, the EU should provide as much support as possible for a gradual reform process that accommodates the huge obstacles these countries face. A “reforms blitz” is unlikely to work.
At the same time, the EU needs to think outside the box to keep those countries who desire a closer relationship with the EU on track. For now, Brussels only goes so far as to demand that states spend the next ten years implementing the Association Agreement and the DCFTA. But politically, this is hardly attractive. New incentives and milestones are needed – be it a Customs Union that would further deepen trade relations and improve customs control, or popular initiatives such as the elimination of roaming charges, or integration in the EU's emerging energy union or digital market. These incentives are not a magic wand that would trigger a full-scale transformation – local politicians need to own the reforms first – but they would send the right signal to those promoting reforms in the EaP: while the path is long, it is worth following.
Russia might see the EaP states as different countries – but not all of them are seen as “foreign”. It is also much more significant trade partner for the region than it was for CEE countries a few years after communism’s collapse. That is why Moscow is keener to preserve its foothold there than it was in Central Europe in the 1990s. And while Russia also claimed a sphere of influence in Central Europe and the Baltics, it is in the eastern neighbourhood where it used an armed invasion, support for secessionists and land grabs to defend it. The EU should not accept Moscow's moves to recreates its zones of influences – but it should not ignore them either. This would put the EU itself at risk, as the case of Ukraine shows.
The EU should not withdraw from the region and stop supporting those seeking a westward orientation – quite the opposite. In many ways, the EU has already won in the region – most countries are trying to escape Moscow's embrace and seek closer ties with Brussels. But with this “victory” comes more responsibility. For the EU, this means not ignoring the grievances between the Eastern partners and their neighbours, including Russia – even if some of Moscow’s grievances are often imagined. One such example is the European Commission’s mediation of annual talks between Russia and Ukraine on securing winter gas supplies.
Of course, it takes all sides to agree. Moscow's aggression in Ukraine has made finding win-win solutions all the more difficult. The EU should seek potential compromises where possible. But it should also be prepared for confrontation and be ready to provide assistance if necessary. This was the case with the trade talks with Moscow and Ukraine: after they produced no results, the EU stepped up its support for Kyiv's DCFTA implementation and expanded the quotas for Ukrainian products entering the EU market.
In other words, when the EU takes sides on the basis of simplistic divisions, it deepens the polarisation in the region. This in turn undermines the EU’s credibility in the eyes of the population, reducing its influence and room for manoeuvre. Europe needs an unpartisan approach rooted in an understanding of the local possibilities: it should partner with those actors that can deliver reforms, irrespective of their current label.
Finally, the EU needs to take a better note of domestic political realities in the region. In some cases, the EU's reform demands resemble a Christmas wish-list made by a child oblivious to their parent's financial means. Brussels is right to demand high standards and the best reforms possible, but it must be more aware of domestic political constraints. The EU should not drop its reform requirements, but demands and expectations should be adjusted to the local context. This will not provide an instant solution to the region's many problems but it can help ease the EU's long-suffered Eastern Partnership fatigue. (abridged)
The author is a Policy Director at Rasmussen Global. The article was origibally published by the European Council on Foreign Relations.
Where were you when the Berlin Wall was torn down? All of us in Europe who experienced November 9, 1989 can answer this question. When East and West Germans embraced each other with tears of joy 30 years ago, this did not only spell the end to the division of Germany. When the Wall came down, the Iron Curtain – which had divided our continent for 40 years – was also torn.
The European Commission’s assessment of Bulgaria’s progress is positive and it comes as no surprise. First and foremost, the country has implemented all EC recommendations and secondly – we believe that the monitoring mechanism itself is discriminatory.
It was not that long ago so I am sure that the older of my fellow journalists have not forgotten the obscurantist days our guild had to live through in Bulgaria. No, I am not referring to the years leading up to the events of 10 November 1989, but about the following decade.